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MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND TOBIN´S Q: THE 
IMPLICATIONS FOR DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT 




Abstract: This paper constructs a theoretical model of investment 
decision abroad supporting the idea that the Multinational 
Enterprises’ internalization decision is    influenced by the capital 
installation cost. This modification alters MNE’s  investment 
behavior. Using the idea that capital mobility across countries is 
associated with the capital installation cost then the firm’s 
maximization  problem may also incorporate the Tobin’s  q  in a 
modified fashion. 
 
JEL:  F13, F21, F23 
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 1. Introduction  
 
     Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been an important feature of 
the world economy for many years and has often been the principle 
vehicle for the movement of international capital. According to 
Lipsey (1999), FDI has accounted for about a quarter of total capital 
outflows in the 1990s. A particular framework of thought about 
foreign direct investment and multinational enterprises (MNE) is 
now dominant. Either by using a partial or a general equilibrium 
model this framework suggests why multinational firms should exists 
at all in the face of presumed barriers for operating across countries 
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(see inter alia Helpman (1984)  Lipsey and Kravis (1987) Markusen 
and Venables (1998) ). 
 
     The more recent works, attempting to explain the pattern of FDI 
in relation to country and industry characteristics, the so-called new 
theory of MNE, incorporate elements from industrial organization 
approach to trade. In this research path an important aspect in the 
internalization decision undertaken by MNEs is the barriers and the 
cost associated with the internalization decision. Further, the 
distinction between “vertical” and “horizontal” firms provides the 
adequate framework for the separation of barriers in categories. 
Vertical MNEs (VER) are firms that geographically fragment 
production in stages according to the production factor intensity of 
the host country referring to single plant firms with their headquarter 
and plant in different countries. Horizontal MNEs (HOR) are 
multiplants firm that replicate the same activities in many locations 
to serve the local markets. This type of MNE refers to two plants 
firms with their headquarter in one country or another and are more 
likely to expand production horizontally across borders the higher are 
the transport costs and trade barriers and the lower are investment 
barriers and the size of scale economies at the plant level relative to 
the corporate level.  For firms organized vertically across borders, the 
barriers are associated with the different factor supplies. Across to 
this line of research Markusen and Maskus (1999a,b) attempted to 
integrate these models, allowing firms the options of multiple plans
1. 
According to this view, the MNEs are seen as firms exploiting some 
ownership advantage through investment abroad.   The common 
characteristic in all these treatments of FDI is that capital will  be 
adjusted into a different country without incurring frictional cost.  
 
     In this paper we adopt a rather different approach and the 
following question will be addressed here. Do capital installation cost 
influence MNE’s investment decision? The Tobin’s  q model of 
investment explicitly accounts for the adjustment costs borne when a 
firm changes the amount of capital it is using. This modification 
alters MNE’s  investment behavior and the objective of this work is 
to extend the inquiry as regards the barriers by investigating the 
relative importance of the installation cost examining the effects of International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.1-2(2004) 
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capital’s  installation cost on FDI. It must be said that for the purpose 
of the present work, I did not separate MNE into categories since 
both classes of investments requires capital installation.  Another 
reason of non-discriminating is related to the data. I don’t have good 
data on the types of the existing firms and these pure types are 
greatly blurred in reality in any case.  
 
     The rest of the paper i s organized as follows. The next section 
reviews the literature. The third section extends the theoretical model 
of Tobin’s q to incorporate the investment decision abroad. At the 
end, section four concludes.   
 
2. Previous Theoretical and Empirical  Research     
 
     The relevant analysis of MNE and FDI establishes the types of 
barriers for the active firms. MNE are seen as being willing to engage 
in FDI instead of alternatives activities if the benefits arising from the 
firm level economies of scale and  the proximity advantage are 
important relative to plant level economies and to transport cost. 
Although there are interesting theoretical differences between the 
general and the partial equilibrium line of research, the econometric 
investigation ends-up with similar independent variables. The 
theoretical and empirical works of 1990’s and the models developed 
probably provide the most coherent framework to analyze the 
increasing importance of FDIs as regards the industrial organization 
and the country incorporating simultaneously microfoundation 
features.  Along with this research avenue, the barriers are significant 
factors affecting the FDI decision making of the MNEs. For example,  
Zakharov and  Kušic, discussing the role of FDI in the Western 
Balkans accession process in the EU, identify both  non-economic 
(e.g. ethnic nationalism, political instability, lack of laws, a 
“fragmented” region with numerous state borders on the small area, 
visas, bureaucracy, etc) and economic factors (e.g. low level of 
economic development, individual markets with low buying power, 
underdeveloped infrastructure, numerous trade restrictions, a large 
share of shadow economy) that impede the regional trade and the 
FDIs in the area. Worth (2003), in his study of the effect of regional Chionis, D.         Multinational Enterprises and Tobin’ s q: The Implications for FDI 
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trade agreements on FDIs, mentions that Japanese FDIs appear to be 
sensitive to trade barriers or the threat of trade barriers. Japanese 
firms are more pessimistic about protectionism than are U.S. firms. 
However, it is worth mentioning that the U.S. firms don’t ascribe to 
the trade barriers the importance the Japanese firms do when they 
consider to invest in the E.U. Several studies, referring to the FDIs 
from the U.S.A., show weakly positive effect of barriers on FDIs or 
no effect at all. Sivadasan (2003), referring to the Indian 
manufacturing sector, shows that FDIs liberalization (i.e. by 
removing several barriers that increased the FDIs) has led to a 25% 
increase in aggregate output growth and a 15% increase in aggregate 
productivity, with the major beneficiaries from the post-liberalization 
productivity gains being the consumers in the form of relatively 
lower prices. The analysis of barriers as factors affecting the FDIs are 
often discussed in a general equilibrium framework.  In particular, 
the simulation results implemented by Markusen and Maskus 
(1999a,b) suggested a number of independent variables that can be 
considered  as barriers. The authors propose an index of investment 
barriers and trade barriers, i.e. costs not including distance or freight 
into host country. They also use distance between pair of counties 
and hypothesize trade barriers back into the parent country. They 
define the cost of investing in the affiliate country as a simple 
average of several indexes of impediments to investment, reported in 
the World Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum. 
These indexes include restrictions on ability to acquire control in a 
domestic company, limitations on the ability to employ foreign 
skilled labor, restraints on negotiating joint ventures, strict controls 
on hiring and firing practices, market dominance by a small number 
of enterprises, an absence of fair administration of justice, difficulties 
in acquiring local bank credit, restrictions on access to local and 
foreign capital markets, and inadequate protection of intellectual 
property. A traded cost index is defined as a measure of national 
protectionism or efforts to prevent importation of competitive 
products. They also use distance capturing trade costs or investment 
costs since both should rise with distance. An interesting feature 
which arises from this work is that they separate the barriers 
according to the type of MNE.  On the HOR model it is assumed 
positive traded cost. Since an HOR has usually several plants, International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.1-2(2004) 
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according to the trade off between exporting to a market and creating 
an affiliate there in order for the multiple plants to form a single 
multinational corporation, it is assumed that there are fixed costs at 
the firm level (in the form of knowledge capital, patents or 
blueprints). On the other hand a VER contains a headquarter that 
supplies headquarter services without transport cost (such as R&D, 
financial and strategic planning) to a plant. 
 
     Barrios  et.al., using a model developed by Markusen and 
Venables (1998) as a theoretical framework, address the properties of 
empirical measures to proxy displacement of national by MNE 
between two countries. These indexes are withdrawn from the World 
Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum. Other 
empirical investigations (see inter alia Brainard  (1997)) of the FDI 
by MNEs are very often  conducted with reference of  the cost of 
investing in the affiliate country as a simple average of several 
indexes of impediments to invest.   
 
3. The Model 
 
     All the previous works highlight a number of important aspects in 
the overall investment decisions of a MNE which can negatively 
influence the decision, but they hypothesized that the capital moves 
without cost across national borders. This assumption is patently 
unrealistic. So, internalization decisions taken by MNE are frequently 
interdependent with investment decisions and thus with the 
commitment of the investor to increase the employed capital. The 
previous works often ignores this aspect because it does not arise in 
perfect capital markets or in market without installation cost. 
However, a firm wishing to internalize its business in a foreign 
country has to contribute a major share of capital abroad not without 
cost. Consequently, a possible way to explain the different 
performance of MNEs as regards FDI, might be the installation cost. 
Black and Lawrence  (1991) present a test of direct foreign 
investment efficacy using Tobin’s q ratio. The authors using a pooled 
time series cross sectional sample found that the firm value does not 
seem to increase as the FDI proportion increases nor as geographic Chionis, D.         Multinational Enterprises and Tobin’ s q: The Implications for FDI 
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diversity increases in the examined sample. Disaggregation of the 
total sample by high and low q, which may proxy for differences in 
management quality, indicates statistical support for increased 
geographic diversity  by high q firms. One more study, this by Santis, 
Anderton and Hijzen (2004), also employs the Tobin’s q as a factor 
of the long-run determinants of the Euro area FDIs to the U.S.A. 
during the period 1980-2001.  The authors use panel data and fixed 
effects estimators, stock market indexes common to the U.S. and 
Euro areas, and a measure for economic development common to the 
both Euro area and the U.S.A. and the Tobin’s q. They find that the 
Tobin's q, accounting for the euro area stock market development, 
among other factors (Euro area patents, productivity in the U.S.A., 
volume of bilateral telephone traffic to the U.S.A. relative to Euro 
area, and the Euro area GDP), is a statistically significant variable 
that enhances the traditional knowledge-capital framework 
specification. 
 
     Relied on a framework initialed developed for the Tobin’s  q 
model  ((see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996)), I extend a costly capital 
installation model. Recall that Tobin’s q measures the ratio of the 
shadow value of a unit of capital (the return of capital) over the cost 
(not including installation cost) of new investment. In practice q is 
sometimes measured by the ratio of the market value of the firm to 
the book value of its assets. The model developed below views FDI 
as part of the profit maximization process of  MNE.  
Assuming that the firm’s output is given by: 
 
Y= As F(Ks  Ls  )-  wsLs – (Ks+1  - Ks)    (1) 
 
Then the decision to invest abroad and to add new capital is 
associated with an installation cost equal to  -?Is 
2/2Ks. The output 
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Where: A,K, L, w stand for the productivity variable, capital stock, 
labour used between dates s and s+1 and wages paid  respectively, International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.1-2(2004) 
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the deadweight installation cost is  ?Is 
2/2Ks for purchasing the new 
capital good. The index f indicates the production factors abroad and 
N stands for the inputs financed by means of FDI. 
   
     The sum of the firm’s present and discounted future profits from 
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The first order condition for  investment is  ¶L/¶I=0 which implies: 




s = - + - ) / (
c
 
qs has an interpretation as the shadow price of capital in place, this 
condition implies that q must be equal to marginal cost of investment 








=               (5) 
Equation (5) is a version of the investment equation proposed by 
Tobin (1969) showing that investment is positive when the shadow Chionis, D.         Multinational Enterprises and Tobin’ s q: The Implications for FDI 
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price q of installed capital exceeds 1, the price of new uninstalled 
capital. 
The first order condition for capital is ¶L/¶K=0 in an implicit form 
    -   +     +      +                    + 




     The above equation states that, at an optimum for the MNE the 
date s shadow price of an extra unit of capital is the discounted sum 
of the capital’s marginal product next period, the capital’s marginal 
contribution to lower installation cost next period, the shadow price 
of capital on the next period  and the foreign capital’s marginal 
product next period. 
 
     The present section derives the conditions necessary for MNE to 
involved in FDI.  The framework developed above suggests that a 
reduced form equation for FDI should not only contain the stylized 
barriers of the host country but also elements from the parent 
company financial condition since MNE with q greater than unity are 




     FDI as flow of capital and investment decision is strongly related 
to the activity of MNE.   Although that FDI have been the least 
volatile source of international investment the fact that some 
countries (for example USA) have flipped back and fourth from net 
supplier to net recipient lead us to the conclusion that perhaps it was 
unmeasured investment barriers that accounted for this phenomenon. 
Most of what MNE do depends on the host environment but 
primarily depends on the decisions to maximize the present and 
future profits
2. Firm in t he position where it wishes to undertake  
productive activity both at home and abroad then it will maximizize 
present and future profits. In this framework I  argue that FDI is a  
function of installation cost.  
 
     Although my finding tend to support the Tobin’s q approach to 
the investment decision abroad much more empirical research is 
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1 This has been referred to as the ‘knowledge capital model’. 
2 Lipsey argues that the FDI is mainly financed by the retained earnings of 
the affiliates. 